Ground-Level Intelligence: Action-Oriented Representation and the Dynamics of the Background

First paragraph: Studies of embodied intelligence have often tended to focus on the essentially responsive aspects of bodily expertise (for example, catching a ball once it has been hit into the air). But skilled sportsmen and sportswomen, actors and actresses, dancers, orators, and other performers often execute ritual-like gestures or other fixed action routines as performance-optimizing elements in their pre-performance preparations, especially when daunting or unfamiliar conditions are anticipated. For example, a recent movie (The King's Speech) and a book of memories (Logue and Conradi, 2010) have revealed that, just before broadcasting his historic announcement that the United Kingdom was entering the Second World War, King George VI furiously repeated certain tongue twisters in a resolute effort to overcome his relentless stutter. Such ritualized actions don't merely change the causal relations between performers and their physical environments (although this may well be part of their function); they provide performers with the practical scaffolds that summon more favourable contexts for their accomplishments, by uncovering viable landscapes for effective action rather than unassailable barricades of frightening obstacles. In other words, while the kinds of embodied skills that have occupied many recent theorists serve to attune behaviour to an actual context of activity, whether that context is favourable or not, preparatory embodied routines actively refer to certain potential (and thus non-actual) contexts of a favourable nature that those routines themselves help to bring about, indicating the possibilities of actions disclosed by the desired context. As we shall see, this sort of transformative event, which is exemplified by, but not confined to, the ritualized gestures and routines of skilled performers, is a regular occurrence in everyday skilled activity, not the crowning achievement of a few talented individuals; so the capacity in question belongs centrally to our ordinary suite of bodily skills. The theoretical ramifications of that embodied capacity are the topic of this paper

Parameterized Single-Exponential Time Polynomial Space Algorithm for Steiner Tree

"In the Steiner tree problem, we are given as input a connected n-vertex graph with edge weights in {1,2,...,W}, and a subset of k terminal vertices. Our task is to compute a minimum-weight tree that contains all the terminals. We give an algorithm for this problem with running time O(7.97^k n^4 log W) using O(n^3 log nW log k) space. This is the first single-exponential time, polynomial-space FPT algorithm for the weighted Steiner tree problem." PLEASE NOTE:This is an author-created version that the author has self-archived to the "Aaltodoc" (aaltodoc.aalto.fi) faculty-level repository at Aalto University. The final publication is available at link.springer.com via the link http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47672-7_40Peer reviewe

Naturalizing Dasein and other (Alleged) Heresies

First paragraph: To my mind, being wrong is nowhere near as disheartening as being boring, so I am encouraged by the fact that, in the four chapters immediately preceding this one, four thinkers for whom I have nothing but the utmost intellectual respect have found my ongoing project to articulate the philosophical groundwork for a genuinely Heideggerian cognitive science interesting enough that they have taken the trouble to explain precisely why it is flawed. Just how deep the supposed flaws go depends on which set of criticisms one chooses to read. For Ratcliffe and Rehberg they go very deep indeed, since, for these thinkers, there is a sense in which the very idea of a Heideggerian cognitive science borders on the incoherent. Dreyfus and Rietveld, on the other hand, seem to agree with me that something worth calling a Heideggerian cognitive science is certainly possible; it's just that my version of it is seriously defective

From tacit knowledge to visual expertise: Eye-tracking support in maritime education and training

The maritime pilot is an expert with knowledge on a specific navi- gational route. The maritime pilot cadet undergoes maritime education and training in classrooms, onboard vessels and in simulators. Developing visual expertise is a basic objective. Transferring knowledge from experienced mar- itime pilots to maritime pilot cadets is challenging since some of this knowledge is tacit. The transference is achieved by externalization and socialization pro- cesses. The objective of this pre-study was to assess eye-tracking methodology as a tool to support maritime education and training, and for transferring tacit knowledge. The study was performed in an explorative way during simulator sessions, by interviews, questionnaires and observations. The result shows that eye-tracking methodology is useful for transferring tacit knowledge in simulator settings, but not during other parts of the education and training. The results also show that situational awareness of maritime pilot instructors and maritime pilot cadets increases when utilizing eye-tracking methodology

An Action-Based Approach to Presence: Foundations and Methods

This chapter presents an action-based approach to presence. It starts by briefly describing the theoretical and empirical foundations of this approach, formalized into three key notions of place/space, action and mediation. In the light of these notions, some common assumptions about presence are then questioned: assuming a neat distinction between virtual and real environments, taking for granted the contours of the mediated environment and considering presence as a purely personal state. Some possible research topics opened up by adopting action as a unit of analysis are illustrated. Finally, a case study on driving as a form of mediated presence is discussed, to provocatively illustrate the flexibility of this approach as a unified framework for presence in digital and physical environment

Beyond power:unbridging Foucault and Weber

Today, very few would doubt that there are plenty of reasons to liken Weber’s and Foucault’s theories of power. Nevertheless, their respective works have divergent ethical and ontological preoccupations which should be reconsidered. This paper explores Foucault’s account of a historical episode in Discipline and Punish and Weber’s theory of life spheres, uncovering evidence that there is a need to reassess the conceptual bridges which have been built so far. The exploration reveals a radical difference between a monological theory of power (Foucault) and a multidimensional approach to power (Weber). Yet by unbridging the two thinkers and focusing on other aspects of their theories along with their ideas about power, we also find that alternative links between the two frameworks may offer a more promising critical theory